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I. AN OVERVIEW
HE United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan and most
industrialized nations have adopted patent, copyright and other in-
tellectual property laws. A major or primary purpose of those
laws is to foster innovation, including technological innovation. Indus-
trial and technological innovation is generally perceived as a good be-
cause technological advances increase a society's productivity,1 thus
increasing its wealth and raising living standards. The major industrial-
ized nations also possess competition laws, one of whose purposes is to
preserve, foster and support competitive markets. These nations want to
preserve competitive markets because competitive markets help to allo-
cate available resources to their highest valued uses and generate in-
creased productive efficiency, also helping to enrich society. 2 Since mid-
century, the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan and other nations
have been encouraging international trade, under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO), by progressively lowering their tariffs and eliminating other bar-
riers to trade. 3 These efforts to promote freer trade help to allocate the
world's resources more closely to their highest-valued uses, thereby in-
creasing the aggregate wealth of the entire world.
That all of the major industrialized nations pursue policies that simulta-
neously support innovation, allocative efficiency and production effi-
ciency are to be expected. These policies all aim at the enrichment of
society. Since their underlying goals are similar, seeming conflicts in the
applications of these various laws are capable of being readily resolved.
Resort to the common element-welfare maximization-underlying
them should aid immensely in construing their provisions and in selecting
those interpretations which best harmonize apparent conflicts in their
provisions.
1. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust. Efficiency, Con-
sumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1026 (1987) ("studies
have shown that over the forty-year period from the late 1920s to the late 1960s, at least
half of the gain in United States output was due solely to technological and scientific
progress.").
2. Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Alternative Merger Standards and the Pros-
pects for International Cooperation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 208, 210 (Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Daniel J.
Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita, Antitrust or Competition Laws Viewed in a Trading Context:
Harmony or Dissonance?, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR
FREE TRADE? 269, 277-79 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
3. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust and Trade Issues: Similarities, Differences,
and Relationships, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1049 (1995).
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Despite the common welfare-advancing goals embodied in the intellec-
tual property laws, competition laws and trade policies of these jurisdic-
tions, every jurisdiction has deviated from those goals on occasion. In
this paper, I examine several places where the innovation-fostering goals
of the intellectual property laws have been undercut by legislatures or
courts. The examples come from the United States, Canada, and the Eu-
ropean Union. In many of these examples, I have been able to compare
approaches taken to similar problems in different jurisdictions, thus pro-
viding a comparative-law aspect to this exploration of deviations from
intellectual property goals.
The paper examines Canadian and United States approaches to the
protection of patented pharmaceutical products in Part II. Then, in Part
III, it explores the treatment of patented pharmaceutical products within
the European Union in the context of differing national policies gov-
erning pricing and patent incentives. In Part IV it examines European
and United States approaches to the patenting of DNA and proteins. In
Part V, the paper explores judicial approaches to the protection of com-
puter programs. Finally, in Part VI, the paper examines aspects of United
States intellectual property misuse law and related issues of antitrust law
as they relate to issues that are emerging in Europe and the United
States. In each instance, the paper attempts to draw conclusions about
the welfare effects of the policies examined.
II. THE PATENT REGIME, PHARMACEUTICALS, PRICING,
AND DIFFERING NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE
CANADIAN AND U.S. APPROACHES
TO PHARMACEUTICALS
Patent law is designed to stimulate inventive activity by conferring on
inventors a period of exclusive rights in their inventions. In doing so, it
incorporates several elements: the insight and skill of the inventor in
identifying a societal need or want; the patent law itself that provides the
means for the inventor to capture some of the invention's economic
value; and the market as a means for directing the inventor's efforts to
identify products that will meet social needs. 4 Pharmaceutical patents,
like all patents, are designed to enable their holders to exploit the present
market for society's long-term benefit. Because they cover products that
affect health, this latent conflict (between the long and short terms) is
more likely to be realized in government policies that give added weight
to short-term interests. The attraction of the short-term to policy-makers,
4. The patent system incorporates the advantages and disadvantages of the market.
One of its deficiencies relating to the development of pharmaceutical products is that it
stimulates the development of drugs useful in treating diseases common in developed na-
tions and is not responsive to the needs of poorer societies. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do
the Social Costs and Benefits of the Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals? 11 J. IN-
TELL. PROP. L. (forthcoming 2004).
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however, may be partially offset by the existence of a domestic pharma-
ceutical industry.
These factors suggest that we should expect that legal regimes would
differ in the respect they accord to pharmaceutical patents. Monopoly-
level pharmaceutical prices may provide a stimulus to research and devel-
opment, but the incentive-to-innovation rationale of the patent system is
more easily accepted in nations with a domestic pharmaceutical industry.
In those nations, the relationship between the patent system and the ben-
eficial societal effects reflected in the generation of new medical products
is reinforced when the public is aware of a thriving domestic industry that
is dependent upon that system. It is true, of course, that innovative drugs
are sold worldwide, so that the benefits of patent-stimulated research are
widely available. But the additional factor that the system also supports a
domestic industry sometimes makes the system more politically
acceptable.
A. PATENT PROTECTION FOR PHARMACEUTICALS IN CANADA
Canada provides an interesting example of the two faces of intellectual
property protection in the pharmaceutical industry. Canada is a highly
developed nation, an economy integrated into the global economic sys-
tem and even more heavily integrated with its trading partners in North
America. It has a domestic pharmaceutical industry, albeit one that is
largely composed of branches of foreign multinationals. These multina-
tionals perform a significant amount of research activity in Canada. So,
Canada experiences conflicting pressures. It would like to encourage the
expansion of its domestic pharmaceutical industry, and it would also like
to reduce the amounts that it pays for new pharmaceuticals.
Although Canada has always had an effective patent system, it histori-
cally has accorded a lesser level of protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts than for other subject matter.5 In 1923, Parliament amended the
Patent Act to provide for compulsory patent licenses for the production
of drugs in Canada. 6 Under this legislated scheme, independent Cana-
dian manufacturers would produce generic equivalents of patented drugs
for a set royalty, usually four percent of sales. 7 Although this legislation
was intended to foster competition among drug manufacturers that would
5. On the Canadian treatment of patented pharmaceuticals, see generally Mary At-
kinson, Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Comparative Study of the Law in the
United States and Canada, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 181 (2002); Edward Hore, A Com-
parison of United States and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic Pharmaceutical Market
Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (2000); Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 215
(1999); Joel Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming Issues in Canadian Pharmaceu-
tical Policy and Politics, 40 HEALTH POL'Y 69 (1997).
6. Patent Act, S.C., ch.23, § 187 (1923) (Can.). See Lexchin, supra note 5, at 70; At-
kinson, supra note 5, at 191.
7. Atkinson, supra note 5, at 191. See, e.g., Novopharn Ltd. v. Jassen Pharm. N.V., 41
C.P.R. 3d 384, 389 (1992) (ordering 4% royalty).
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drive down the prices of drugs, it achieved only limited success. 8 During
the four and one-half decades following the amendment, only forty-nine
compulsory licenses were sought and only twenty-two licenses were au-
thorized by the Commissioner of Patents.9 Canadian sources attribute
the small number of licenses to the small size of the Canadian market
being unable to sustain the numerous manufacturing facilities envisioned
by the 1923 legislators. 10 To overcome this hurdle, the Patent Act was
further amended in 1969 to extend compulsory licensing to imported
drugs." The authorities that claim that the Canadian market was too
small to sustain generic drug manufacturing nevertheless report that the
1969 legislation helped to generate a domestic generic drug industry.12
Despite the apparent success of the revised compulsory licensing sys-
tem, Parliament came to take the view that compulsory licensing discour-
aged research and development in Canada. 13 Accordingly, it enacted
legislation in 1987 that deferred the entry of generic licensees for periods
of seven to twenty years. 14 The patentees, however, although released
from the competition of generics for at least seven years, were not free to
price as they saw fit. During the period in which they were free from
competition, the patentees' prices were made subject to control by the
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. 15 Despite the price control,
however, research and development investment increased substantially,
rising from 6.1% of sales in 1988 to 11.8% in 1995.16
The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
required a number of changes in the Canadian patent law. Canada, like
the United States, had previously observed a patent term of seventeen
years from the date that a patent issued. NAFTA obligated its adherents
to observe a patent term of twenty years from the date of filing.17 It also
placed severe limits on compulsory licensing.1 8 In anticipation of
NAFTA, the Parliament eliminated the compulsory-licensing system in
199319 and changed the patent term to twenty years from filing.20 Later,
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) imposed similar obligations. 21
8. See Lexchin, supra note 5, at 70.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also ICN Pharms., Inc. v. Canada (Patented Med. Review Bd.), 66 C.P.R.
3d 45, 48 (1996).
11. See Act to Amend the Patent Act, the Trade Marks Act & the Food & Drugs Act,
R.S.C., ch. 49, § 1 (1968) (Can.).
12. Lexchin, supra note 5, at 104.
13. See ICN Pharms., Inc., supra note 10, at 76.
14. Act to Amend the Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. 41 (1987) (Can.).
15. See ICN Pharms., Inc., supra note 10, at 77.
16. Lexchin, supra note 5, at 71.
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1709(12), 107 Stat.
2057, 32 I.L.M. 605.
18. Id. at art. 1709(10).
19. An Act to Amend the Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. 2, § 3 (1993) (Can.).
20. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 39 (1997) (Can.).
21. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31 (limi-
tations on compulsory licensing), art. 33 (patent term).
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Both the United States and Canada have enacted legislation designed
to ease the entry into the market by generic drug manufacturers. In the
United States this legislation was combined with legislation to restore
some of the patent term which is effectively taken from drug patentees by
the lengthy period in which an already patented drug must await regula-
tory approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before it can
be marketed.22 In the Hatch-Waxman Act, adopted in 1984, Congress
authorized patent term extensions to compensate for this waiting
period.23
The Hatch-Waxman Act also eased the entry of generic manufacturers
by allowing them, during the patent term, to use the patented drug to
prepare their own submissions to the FDA.2 4 They cannot submit their
application for approval, however, until the patent term expires.25 Per-
haps even more important, the Act permits manufacturers of generic
drugs to "piggy-back" on the research of the producer of the original, or
"pioneer," drug and encourages them to challenge the patent and its cov-
erage.26 Under the Act, a generic drug manufacturer is permitted to file
an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") which incorporates the
data previously supplied by the pioneer-drug producer. 27 In addition, the
generic manufacturer must certify information about the patent status of
the pioneer drug: either that no patent has been issued; that the patent
has expired; that the patent is invalid; or that the patent will not be in-
fringed by the generic drug.28 If the generic manufacturer certifies that
the pioneer drug patent is invalid or will not be infringed ("paragraph IV
certification"), the manufacturer of the pioneer drug is given forty-five
days to bring a patent infringement suit.29 The commencement of the
patent action then triggers a stay on the approval of the generic for thirty
months or until the court rules on the issues of patent validity and/or
infringement. 30
The Hatch-Waxman Act further incorporates incentives to attract ge-
neric manufacturers into the market. The first generic manufacturer to
qualify under the paragraph IV certification provisions is rewarded with
quasi-exclusivity: a 180-day period in which it shares the market only with
the patentee, no other generics being permitted to enter during that pe-
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
23. The Hatch-Waxman Act permits extensions of the patent term equal to the time in
which the patentee awaited final FDA approval plus one half of the post-patent-issuance
time taken for running clinical tests. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1)-(2) (2004). The period so calcu-
lated when added to the remaining patent term, however, cannot exceed fourteen years.
Id. § 156(c)(3). And no extension can exceed five years. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2004). This provision overrules Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1), (2)(A)(i)-(iv)(2004).
27. Id.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
29. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
30. Id.
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riod. 3A Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act carries provisions designed both to
reinforce the incentives to innovate by restoring at least some of the pat-
ent term whose usefulness is lost to regulatory delays and to provide in-
centives to generics to challenge or avoid existing patents.
Canadian legislation, enacted in 1993, followed some, but not all, of the
path marked out by the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Canadian legislation
followed the part of the Hatch-Waxman Act that authorized generic pro-
ducers, during the patent term, to use a patented drug to prepare their
own regulatory submissions. 32 The Canadian regulations also followed
several of the Hatch-Waxman procedures. Canadian regulations permit
generic producers to "piggy-back" on the research supporting the pioneer
drug,33 and they establish procedures through which generic producers
may challenge the validity or scope of pioneer patents.34 The Canadian
law and regulations, however, differed from the Hatch-Waxman Act in
their omission of provisions for extending the patent term that compen-
sate the pioneer firms for regulatory delays.3 5 Although the Canadian
legislation also omitted the incentive of the quasi-exclusive periods given
to first generic challengers, it took another route towards making generics
more available. It authorized generic producers to stockpile generic
drugs in readiness for the expiration of the patent.36 Indeed, these differ-
ences in the Canadian legislation are interrelated. Parliament's decision
not to provide for a patent-term extension to compensate for regulatory
delays appears related to its decision to allow stockpiling, in that in com-
bination, these decisions erode the patentee's protections at both ends of
the patent term. The regulatory delay makes the patent commercially
unusable during its early years, the omission of patent-term extension en-
sures that the protected period is shortened by the full amount of the
regulatory delay, and the stockpiling provision means that generic manu-
facturers will be ready to enter the market with a full inventory at the end
of the patent term. This denies the patentee even the compensation af-
forded by the preparation time necessary for its generic rivals to enter the
market.
The European Union challenged the stockpiling legislation before the
WTO as inconsistent with Canada's obligations under the TRIPS Agree-
ment.37 In its challenge, the European Union contended that the stock-
piling legislation was properly seen in the context of Canada's decision
not to provide patent term extensions to compensate for regulatory de-
lays.38 The European Union prevailed in its challenge to the stockpiling
31. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
32. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. 23, § 55.2(1) (1993) (Can.).
33. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations § 5(1).
34. Id.
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2004).
36. Patent Act § 55.2 (repealed). 2001 Annual Statutes of Canada, Ch. 10 (Bill S-17).
37. REPORT OF THE PANEL CANADA-PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS, 2000 WL 301021, *1 (W.T.O.).
38. Id. at *11.
SMU LAW REVIEW
provision.39 However, it failed in an accompanying challenge to the pro-
vision allowing generics to use patented products to prepare their cases
for regulatory approval.40 As a result of the European Union's successful
WTO challenge to the stockpiling provision, the Canadian Parliament re-
pealed it.41
The successful European Union challenge to the Canadian stockpiling
provision reveals the interrelations among the several welfare-enhancing
policies identified above. When the Canadian Parliament shortened the
effective term of pharmaceutical patents, it put the short-term interest of
Canadian residents ahead of the long-term worldwide goal of stimulating
innovation in pharmaceutical products. From a purely domestic perspec-
tive, this position makes sense. The Canadian market is sufficiently small
that a reduction of the patent term to pharmaceutical producers would
not significantly affect their incentives to innovate. 42 So, by enforcing the
rules even in the case of a breach that in itself would not have under-
mined the worldwide intellectual property system, the European Union
helped to ensure that the Canadian deviation would not be repeated.
Moreover, the European Union's challenge also highlighted the fact that
the TRIPS Agreement was part of the overall WTO trade agreement. By
providing protection to the intellectual property that is currently the com-
parative advantage of developed nations, it helps ensure their coopera-
tion in continuing movement towards freer trade under the WTO.
B. AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CANADIAN PATENT LAW MODIFICATION
When the United States and Canada imposed time-consuming regula-
tory responsibilities upon their pharmaceutical regulatory authorities (the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Health Canada), the result was
that the effective period of patent protection for pharmaceutical products
was reduced, because patentees could not legally market those products
during the initial years of the patent period when they were still awaiting
regulatory approval. This effective reduction of the patent period re-
duced the potential profits of patentees, with a concomitant reduction of
incentives. As we observed above, Congress responded to this reduction
of the patent period at the beginning by legislating a compensatory exten-
sion at the end of the period.43 The legislation extending the patent term
did not fully compensate for the initial reduction in the patent term, be-
cause protection at the end of the term is prima facie less valuable than
protection at the beginning. The innovation-inducing function of the pat-
ent system is premised upon the system's incentive effects and the incen-
39. Id. at *174.
40. Id. at *174.
41. Act to Amend the Patent Act (Bill S-17), Assented to 14 June, 2001, codified as
R.S., C. P-4, §§ 45, 78.1, 78.2, 78.4, 78.5.
42. Of course, if the Canadian example were followed by many other jurisdictions,
their incentives might be affected.
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2004).
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tive effects take place from the viewpoint of the potential innovator, prior
to its commitment of assets to its research activities. That viewpoint, ac-
cordingly, assesses potential future profits discounted to their value at the
time when assets are committed to research, i.e., at the beginning. In
short, the compensatory patent-term extension replaces years of high
value protection with years of low value protection. In addition, Con-
gress also placed some limits on the extension: no extension can exceed
five years and the total period encompassed by the remaining patent term
plus the extension period cannot exceed fourteen years. 44 So, the com-
pensatory extension patently does not fully compensate for the loss due
to regulatory review. The legislation permitting generic competitors to
"piggy-back" on the research of the pioneer and providing them permis-
sion to produce the materials necessary to obtain regulatory approval, of
course, also somewhat shortens the patentee's effective period of
exclusivity.
The effects of the United States patent-term extension legislation can
be illustrated as follows. We assume that the approval of the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") takes two years and that FDA approval takes
an additional four years. Although all patentees must wait for approval,
patentees other than pharmaceutical companies are free to market their
products during the waiting period. Because a pharmaceutical company
cannot market its product without FDA approval, it must seek approval
from both the PTO and the FDA and may not market its product until it
has obtained the latter's approval. In an example in which the pharma-
ceutical company loses two years to the PTO and four years to the FDA,
Congress has provided for a patent-term extension for the four years in-
volved in waiting for the FDA approval.
Assume further that patent revenues are a constant amount ($m) for
each year in which the product is marketed. The company's revenues for
this product then-in the absence of a patent term extension-would be as
follows:
return return return return
year 1 -0- year 6 -0- year 11 $m year 16 $m
year 2 -0- year 7 $m year 12 $m year 17 $m
year 3 -0- year 8 $m year 13 $m year 18 $m
year 4 -0- year 9 $m year 14 $m year 19 $m
year 5 -0- year 10 $m year 15 $m year 20 $m
The patent term extension changes the revenue picture to the
following:
44. Id. § 156(c)(3).
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return return return return
year 1 -0- year 6 -0- year 11 $m year 16 $m year 21 $m
year 2 -0- year 7 $m year 12 $m year 17 $m year 22 $m
year 3 -0- year 8 $m year 13 $m year 18 $m year 23 $m
year 4 -0- year 9 $m year 14 $m year 19 $m year 24 $m
year 5 -0- year 10 $m year 15 $m year 20 $m
The returns from years twenty-one through twenty-four are intended to
compensate the patentee for the effective loss of the years three through
six. But, however well intentioned, the legislation does not provide an
effective scheme of compensation, given the purposes of the patent law to
promote innovation. Had the patentee been permitted to exploit its pat-
ent in years three through six, its expected profits in those years would
have a substantially higher value than the expected profits from years
twenty-one through twenty-four, the years of the patent term extension.
The patent law promotes innovation by providing the prospect of an
economic reward to the innovator. The structure of this incentive mecha-
nism requires that the reward be assessed at the beginning, i.e., at the
time that the innovator decides to commit resources to the research effort
that it hopes will ultimately culminate in a successful product, producing
a stream of revenues that compensates it for its research costs and the
risks involved, and, in addition, produces a profit. It is at this initial pe-
riod that the innovator weighs the risks against the potential revenue
stream. Thus, the projected revenue stream must be discounted to its
present value as of the commencement of the project.
Restating the revenue stream in terms of the present discounted value
of the future revenue stream looks like this:
year 1 -0- year 9 $m/(l+r)9  year 17 $m/(l+r) 7
year 2 -0- year 10 $m/(l+r) °  year 18 $m/(l+r)"8
year 3 -0- year 11 $m/(l+r)" year 19 $m/(l+r) 9
year 4 -0- year 12 $m/(l+r)"2  year 20 $m/(l+r)2 °
year 5 -0- year 13 $m/(l+r)13  year 21 $m/(l+r)21
year 6 -0- year 14 $m/(l+r)14  year 22 $m/(+r)12
year 7 $m/(l+r)7  year 15 $m/(l+r)15  year 23 $m/(l+r) 3
year 8 $m/(l+r)8  year 16 $m/(l+r) 16  year 24 $m/(l+r)24
The present value of years twenty-one through twenty-four are sub-
stantially less than the present value of years three through six, as is ap-
parent from the higher valued exponent on the denominator (and thus
the greater the denominator and the lower value of the entire term). The
extension compensates high value years with low value years:
1348 [Vol. 57
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year 3 $m/(l+r)3  > year 21 $m/(l+r)2"
year 4 $m/(l+r)4  > year 22 $m/(l+r)2
year 5 $m/(l+r)5  > year 23 Sm/(l+r)"
year 6 $m/(l+r)6  > year 24 Sm/(l+r)"
The Hatch-Waxman Act extension thus suggests that it compensates
patentees, but in fact it does not. It is puzzling why Congress legislated in
a way that obscured its decision to undercompensate pharmaceutical pat-
entees.45 The answer may lie in the complex political context in which this
legislation was enacted. The pharmaceutical companies wanted compen-
sation for the effective loss of the early years of the patent term due to
the FDA regulatory delay. However, they probably deemed it politically
impractical to ask for full compensation, since that would have entailed
an extension period greater than the delay. Moreover, they would be
opposed by consumer groups, focusing on the short-term welfare of their
members who would have ridiculed an analysis that reduced the value of
the extension years to their present value. In that context, Congress was
responding to the pressures of both groups. The legislation both gives to
the pharmaceutical companies (by extending the patent term) and takes
from them (by fostering patent challenges and the entry of generics).
That was probably the best that the pharmaceutical companies could
obtain.
An analysis of corresponding Canadian law is more straightforward.
The absence of a powerful research-based pharmaceutical industry meant
that the Canadian Parliament faced pressure from just the consumer di-
rection. The logic of arguments based upon future global benefits engen-
dered by patent protection is likely to succumb to the demands of
consumer groups asserting their present interest in lower drug prices.
The short-term interests of Canadians is furthered when the rights of
pharmaceutical companies are curtailed. The actions of Parliament and
the Health Minister that curtailed the patent rights of the pharmaceutical
companies (denial of patent-term extension and stockpiling) are thus un-
problematic. They become more problematic when they are assessed
against the standard of global long-term welfare. But the democratic po-
litical process is less likely to produce an optimum result when it ad-
dresses long-term welfare. And it is even less likely to respond optimally
to global welfare concerns, at least when global welfare is not an exact
match to domestic welfare.
45. Congress sometimes legislates in ways that create the appearance that it is legislat-
ing for the benefit of the larger society while it actually casts the legislation in terms that
benefit organized lobbying groups. See, e.g., MURRAY J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES
OF POLITICS 40 (1964).
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III. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
AN UNRESOLVED DILEMMA
Within the European Union the interplay between the treaty provision
protecting the free movement of goods,46 varying terms of intellectual
property protection, the exhaustion doctrine, and varying regulatory con-
trols has made significant inroads upon the incentive structure of intellec-
tual property laws. Because the pharmaceutical companies have been
subjected to different degrees of regulation in the several nations within
the European Union, they have borne an especially heavy burden. In the
early years of the Common Market, many European nations did not rec-
ognize patents over pharmaceutical products. Patent rights over pharma-
ceutical products were recognized in the United Kingdom and Ireland in
statutes and case law prior to the establishment of the Treaty of Rome. 47
But that was not true for most other European countries. Germany rec-
ognized pharmaceutical patents only in 1967, Italy in 1978, Denmark in
1983, Norway in 1992, Greece in 1992, Spain in 1992, and Finland in
1995.48 Although all of the member nations now provide patent protec-
tion to pharmaceutical products, the market for these products has been,
and continues to be, subject to various kinds of government intervention.
As a result, prices vary substantially from country to country. These sub-
stantial price variations help to create the conditions for arbitrage.
The wide range of drug prices was illustrated in Merck & Co. v. Stephar
BV.49 That case involved large-scale purchases of a pharmaceutical prod-
uct in a low-price national market and resales in a high-price market.5 0
The particular drug involved (and on which Merk held patents) was for
the treatment of hypertension.5 1 Merck marketed it under the trademark
"Moduretic. 52 Evidence submitted by the defendant showed price varia-
tions among seven countries. 53 Taking the price in the Federal Republic
of Germany as a reference price at 100, the prices in other nations were:
Netherlands 140; Denmark 76; Belguim 102; United Kingdom 58; France
46. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Arti-
cles 28-30. O.J. C. 325, 24 Dec. 2002.
47. Pharmaceutical patents were recognized in the United Kingdom in Acetylene Illu-
minating Co. v. United Alkali Co. 1905 R.P.C. 145, 153, and in the Patents Act 1949,
§ 4(7). Ireland recognized such patents in its Patents Act 1964, § 2. Prior to that time the
Irish courts may have been influenced on this issue by the House of Lords decision in
Acetylene Illuminating Co., supra, which was rendered prior to Irish independence. See
Merck v. Primecrown Ltd, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, 6317-18, n.64. (opinion of Advocate
General).
48. See Merck v. Primecrown Ltd, supra note 47, at 6317-18, nn.64-69. The history of
Italian patent protection is discussed in Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063,
2065.
49. 1981 E.C.R. 2063.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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51; and Italy 56.54 The low prices in France were apparently due to price
controls exerted by the French government. 55 The low prices in the
United Kingdom were apparently the result of government market
interventions.5 6
The basic structure of the law governing the arbitraging of patented
pharmaceutical products was established in 1974 in Centrafarm BV v.
Sterling Drug, Inc. 57 well before universal recognition was accorded to
patents on these products. That case involved patents owned by Sterling
Drug, Inc., a New York corporation, on a product (acidum nalidixicum)
used for treatment of urinary passage infections and marketed under the
trademark "Negram. '' 58 Sterling owned patents in the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands. 59 As in the case of many drugs, prices in the United
Kingdom were substantially less than in the Netherlands. 60 Indeed, the
United Kingdom price was one-half of the Netherlands price.61 Prices
were also lower in Germany than they were in the Netherlands.62 Cen-
trafarm purchased Negram in the United Kingdom and in Germany and
shipped it to the Netherlands where it resold it at higher prices. 63 Sterling
sought to bar Centrafarm from importing the product into the Nether-
lands on the ground that its Netherlands patent rights gave it exclusive
control over the product in that country.64 Sterling's position was re-
jected, however, by the Court of Justice which ruled that Sterling's patent
rights over the particular products subsequently imported into the
Netherlands were exhausted when it or its subsidiaries sold them in the
United Kingdom and in Germany.65 Indeed, exhaustion is a corollary of
the treaty provision guaranteeing the free movement of goods. Once a
person acquires title to goods, that person is free to sell them throughout
the European Union.66 That right of resale includes goods subject to in-
tellectual property rights, so long as the rights-holder has authorized their
54. Id. at 2075.
55. See VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 261 (7th ed. 2000).
56. Id.
57. Centrafarm BV & Adriaan de Peijper v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 2
C.M.L.R. 480.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1149.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The rule that a patentee's rights over a particular physical product are exhausted
after the sale of that product has been observed in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cyrix
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 846 F. Supp. 522, 538 (E.D. Tex.), aff'd, 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(applying exhaustion doctrine in the United States). A national court ruling that patent
rights over a particular physical product were exhausted by a sale within that nation is
applying a doctrine of domestic exhaustion. A court ruling that patent rights over a physi-
cal product were exhausted by a sale abroad is applying a doctrine of international exhaus-
tion. Although this is technically true, the Union itself is analogous to a federation in
which "domestic" jurisdiction extends throughout the federation.
66. 1974 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
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initial sale.67 Sterling's second line of attack against Centrafarm was
based on trademark. 68 Sterling contended that it had the exclusive right
over the Negram trademark in the Netherlands and that this right was
infringed when Centrafarm imported Negram-branded drugs into that
nation. 69 Sterling again lost on similar reasoning by the court. 70 Once a
product is sold with the consent of the trademark owner, the purchaser is
free to resell it anywhere in the European Union.71
Later, the court reached a similar decision in Merck & Co. v. Stephar
BV.72 In this case, it was the absence of patent protection in Italy that
caused the problem for Merck. 73 Merck sold its "Moduretic" drug in It-
aly even though it had been unable to secure patent protection there.74
At the time the case was decided, Italy had restored patent protection for
pharmaceuticals, 75 but the restoration was too late for Merck's product
which was then in widespread public use. Stephar BV, an importer, pur-
chased Moduretic in Italy and resold it at higher prices in the Nether-
lands, undercutting Merck.76 Like Sterling in the earlier case, Merck
wanted to employ its Netherlands patent to bar the imports from Italy. 77
Although Merck had hoped that because no patent protection was availa-
ble in Italy the court would distinguish Centrafarm, its hopes were disap-
pointed. The court ruled that the treaty provision guaranteeing the free
movement of goods throughout the European Union prevented the pat-
ent law of any member state from barring the importation of those
goods.78 In essence, the court told Merck that if it chose to sell its goods
in Italy where there was no patent protection, then it had to bear the
consequences. Later decisions have refined these rules, holding, for ex-
ample, that exhaustion will not destroy a patentee's right to exclude prod-
ucts that the importer has obtained unlawfully or without the consent of
the patentee. 79 Centrafarm was reaffirmed by the Court of Justice in its
1996 decision in Primecrown.80
Primecrown involved the purchase of pharmaceutical products sold by
Merck in Spain and Portugal, at a time before those countries offered
67. 1974 2 C.M.L.R. at 503-04.
68. See Cetrafarm BV & Adriaan de Peijper v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 2
C.M.L.R. 480.
69. Sterling had raised the issue in a Netherlands court. That court referred the ques-
tion to the Court of Justice. See id. at 1.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Winthrop BV, supra note 68, at 10.
72. See supra note 50.
73. See supra note 50, at 2063.
74. See id. at 2063.
75. Indeed, Italy had abolished patent protection over pharmaceuticals in 1939. Arti-
cle 14(1) of the Italian Patent Law (Royal Decree of 29 June 1939, No. 1127). Italy did not
reinstate such protection until 1978, when the Italian Constitutional Court invalidated the
earlier law. See discussion in Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 2065.
76. See supra note 50, at 2063.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285, at T 41.
80. Id.
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patent protection to pharmaceuticals, and their resale in the United King-
dom.81 Merck sought to bar the importation of the products from Spain
and Portugal by invoking its UK patent rights. 82 In its argument, Merck
contended that the lack of patent protection in those countries exerted a
depressing effect on prices, thus exacerbating its exposure to arbitrage.
83
The Advocate General, however, recognized that this argument had
wider implications: that its logic would ultimately apply to the lower
prices compelled by government price controls and other market inter-
ventions. His request that the court overrule Centrafarm broadly can
perhaps be understood in that light.
8 4
Critics have charged that the application of the exhaustion doctrine by
the Court of Justice has undermined the incentive function of the patent
laws, as they apply to pharmaceuticals. 85 Valentine Korah sees it anoma-
lous that while the Council of the European Union is trying to strengthen
intellectual property protection, the Court of Justice is reducing that pro-
tection through its reaffirmation of the Centrafarm line of decisions. 86
Korah is concerned that this line of decisions frustrates patentees from
earning the rewards that the patent system promises and, accordingly, un-
dermines its incentive structure. In asking the court to overrule Cen-
trafarm in the Primecrown case, the Advocate General took a similar line
of argument. Critics have further charged that the Centrafarm rule forces
the national policy that is least protective to the pharmaceutical compa-
nies upon the other nations, thus engendering a kind of race to the bot-
tom in intellectual property protection. 87
In the critics' view, the court has ignored the different commercial real-
ities between patented pharmaceutical products and other products. 88
The interpretative path taken by the Court of Justice encourages arbi-
trage. Generally this makes sense. Strict application of Article 28 to all
commerce assists in the erosion of national barriers and the creation of a
common market. Here arbitrage (now aided by the Euro as a common
currency that increases the visibility of price differences) helps to erode
separate national markets. But the intensive (and inconsistent) regula-
tion applied by the member nations to pharmaceuticals itself helps to
generate separate markets for those products. The strict application of
Article 28 to pharmaceuticals would only make sense if the European
Union also sought to adopt a common policy on price control and similar
market interventions for pharmaceutical products. A common price con-
trol policy would produce a common, albeit regulated, market. Alterna-
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 1996 E.C.R. 1-6285 (opinion of Advocate General).
85. See Korah, supra note 55, at 262, 272-73.
86. See supra note 57, at 278.
87. See, e.g., Andreas Reindl, Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 819, 833-34 (1997).
88. Valentine Korah, Consent in Relation to Curbs of Parallel Trade, 25 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 972, 973 (2002).
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tively, an unregulated free market in each nation would also produce a
European Union common market. In either case, arbitrage would
disappear.
But, the European Union has taken neither position. It is apparently
willing to live with a system in which the pricing of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is subject to differing national policies and consequently are sold in
different national markets. As a result, in the view of the critics, the court
appears to be applying an exhaustion doctrine in a way that serves no
purpose at all.89 Article 28 generally helps to create a common market in
most (unregulated) goods. 90 However, a strict application of Article 28
to products like pharmaceuticals that are subject to differing systems of
national regulation appears to undermine the marketing of the patentees
without an underlying justification. At least, that is the charge that is
made by some critics. 91 It is true that the pharmaceutical companies are
learning to operate within this system. Companies such as Bayer have
begun limiting their sales to distributors within each member state to
their estimates of national consumption. 92 Combined with member-state
requirements that local distributors maintain stocks adequate for national
needs,93 this policy effectively impedes arbitrage. The Court of Justice
has recently ruled that this practice is lawful under Article 81(1) of a Eu-
ropean version of the Colgate doctrine, since no concerted action is in-
volved.94 The limited ability of the companies to avoid the consequences
of a European Union policy fostering arbitrage, however, does not pro-
vide a rationale for an internal trade policy that appears designed to un-
dermine the intellectual property policies of the member states. Why do
the European Union authorities not take steps to bring their trade, intel-
lectual property and healthcare policies into alignment?
Let us consider the European Union Centrafarm rule in the light of the
incentive structure of patent (and other intellectual property) law. That
rule certainly facilitates arbitrage and, thus, may help to undermine the
patentee's prices in a high-price market. Thus, if we were to take the
position that overall welfare is furthered when the patent mechanism fos-
ters pharmaceutical research, we would favor overruling Centrafarm.
This is a strong anti-Centrafarm position based upon the long-term wel-
fare effects of patent law. But if we took that position, we would also
want to abolish interventions in the market by governments through price
controls or other devices designed to hold pharmaceutical prices to low
levels. However, that position is a policy position that would be politi-
89. See Korah, supra note 55, at 262 ("That is not a reason, but a conclusion.").
90. See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European
Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331, 378 (2003).
91. See, e.g., Korah, supra note 55, at 272-73; Korah, supra note 88, at 972-73. Korah
has repeatedly expressed her view that patented pharmaceuticals should be treated differ-
ently from other products under Article 28, because they are subjected to differing price
regulations in the different member states.
92. Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure v. Bayer, 2004 O.J. (C 59) 2.
93. See id. at T 110.
94. See Bayer, supra note 92, at 141.
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cally justified only by viewing the aggregate interests of the European
Union as a whole (rather than the separate interests of the individual
nations composing it). Any one nation, especially smaller ones without a
domestic pharmaceutical industry, may find that its interest lies in ensur-
ing low prices in the present. The incentive effect of high prices in that
country alone is minimal. Thus, on a balance between present welfare
and future welfare, the balance for such a nation falls on the side of maxi-
mizing present or short-term welfare. Since the nations of the European
Union do not agree on pharmaceutical policy, there is no European
Union-wide option. It follows that each constituent nation must be free
to follow its own interest.
A tentative conclusion thus emerges. There can be no EU-wide policy
on pharmaceuticals because the interests of the member states are not
aligned. In order for a common policy to emerge, the member states
would have to engage in significant bargaining, trading off some interests
in pharmaceutical policy for compensating benefits in other areas. This
might be done at one of the periodic revisions of the Treaty of Rome or
perhaps through the European Council. In the meantime, all parties have
to live with existing policy differences. But, given these policy differ-
ences, should the least protective national policy be allowed to under-
mine the more protective national policies? Or should the nations with
the more protective policies be allowed to preserve them against the un-
dermining potential of arbitrage? The latter position is a weak anti-Cen-
trafarm position: it favors overruling Centrafarm not on substantive policy
grounds but on the grounds of protecting national autonomy. If we opt
for the latter position (which is the position of the critics and the Advo-
cate General), then do we give up on the goal of a common market for
pharmaceuticals? That is, do we recognize that the Centrafarm rule is
merely a symbolic, but ineffective, gesture towards that end? I suggest
that there is a middle ground: one that recognizes the policy differences
among the member states of the European Union and at the same time
recognizes the importance of fostering a common market among all prod-
ucts, including pharmaceuticals. To make the case for this third position,
I draw from the United States experience, comparing the law and eco-
nomics prevailing in the United States with the situation within the Euro-
pean Union.
The doctrine of international exhaustion applied in the European
Union appears similar (albeit not identical) to the approach of the United
States courts. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
trademarked items sold abroad by a United States enterprise or its sub-
sidiaries or licensees can be lawfully imported into the United States. 95 A
similar rule applies to copyrighted goods. 96 Although the law appears
less clear in the case of patents, there is ground for believing that the
same rule applies to the importation into the United States of patented
95. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 294 (1988).
96. Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998).
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goods produced with the consent of the United States patentee. 97 Goods,
however, that have been produced under a patent license in which the
license terms confine the rights conferred upon the licensee to a specific
geographic area may be treated differently. It is clear that a patentee
may restrict a license geographically, and the law specifically contem-
plates assignments of geographical rights.98 But, it remains unclear
whether a purchaser from a licensee or assignee of geographical limited
rights, who has purchased the patented product abroad, may import the
product into the United States. Yet, this problem is perhaps more theo-
retical than real, because United States patent owners could minimize the
prospect of importation by forbidding their foreign licensees to sell to
purchasers who refuse to provide assurances that they will not ship to the
United States. 99
The European and United States laws are also similar in their provi-
sions dealing with the free movement of goods within their jurisdiction.
The European Union's Article 28 that bars quantative restrictions on im-
ports by member states has a parallel in the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution100 that prevents individual states from barring
imports from other states. 101 The purpose of both provisions is the same:
the establishment of a "common market"'10 2 throughout the larger
jurisdiction.
Despite the similarities, United States law differs significantly from Eu-
ropean law in its impact. While the United States and Europe appear to
apply the exhaustion doctrine in a similar manner, the presence in the
European Union of different national markets that result in part from
differing regulatory regimes has no parallel in the United States. While
there are differences in the structure of health insurance among the states
of the United States and minor differences in the regulation of healthcare
providers, these differences do not appear to have generated separate ge-
ographical markets for pharmaceutical products. This is not to say that
all such products are sold at the same price to all buyers. Retail prices
vary substantially as a result of bargaining by health maintenance organi-
zations, insurance companies, large employers, drug store chains and
others whose patronage is important to the pharmaceutical companies.10 3
97. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71, 78 (2d
Cir. 1920).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2004).
99. See Gen. Talking Pictures Co. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938) (recog-
nizing that license limitations can prevent licensee from conveying title to a third party).
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
101. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the
Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227
(1995); Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
102. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994).
103. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 783 (7th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 659-60 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Ferro, 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2001). See Roy LEVY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS-
TRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF
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Discount pharmacies and internet pharmacies help to pass on these lower
prices to their customers. Retail prices are also subsidized by insurance
companies to their insureds. Yet, these sometimes wide variations in the
prices of pharmaceutical products take place within a single geographic
market.
The United States experience suggests a way of reacting to the Euro-
pean Union caselaw that takes account of political differences within the
European Union and, yet, would help to foster a common market in
pharmaceuticals. Critics like Korah assert that the court's decisions un-
dermine the incentives of the pharmaceutical companies to develop new
drugs. 10 4 She makes these assertions because she focuses upon the arbi-
trage effects: Shipments from low price countries into high-price coun-
tries undermine the patentee's high prices in the latter.10 5 But the United
States provides a counter example. No one contends that the market in
the United States is segmented geographically. Yet, prices in the United
States vary widely as already noted. Moreover, prices in the United
States are affected by the large purchases made through the Medicaid
program and the controls that the federal and state governments exert
over Medicaid pricing.106 The federal government through the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs also wields buying power to obtain substantial
discounts. 10 7 Because governments purchase drugs for use by those who
would otherwise be unable to afford them, they have raised the demand
for drugs, generating an upward pressure on their prices. Conversely, be-
cause the governments are large buyers, they can and do exert downward
pressure on prices through their purchases.108 It would be possible for
the nations of the European Union to follow approximately the same pol-
icies that they are now following, if the nations that now impose price
controls were to substitute government purchases at negotiated prices.
There is no reason to believe that the pharmaceutical companies that
choose to market their products in nations imposing price controls would
not be willing to sell them to government agencies in those nations at
negotiated prices that were identical to the present regulated prices. In
such cases, the companies would probably tailor the quantities sold to the
needs of the particular nation, thus minimizing the prospect of arbitrage,
CHANGE 78-79 (FTC Bu. Econ. Staff Rep't, Mar. 1999) (reporting that for 1994, hospitals
paid an average of 91% of price paid by retail pharmacies, HMOs paid 82%, and federal
facilities paid 58%).
104. See supra note 57, at 278.
105. Id.
106. On Medicaid pricing see generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2004) (incorporating rebate
norm of difference between manufacturer's average and "best" prices to independent pur-
chasers). On state efforts at price control see generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003), and Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass'n v. Meadows, 304 F.3d
1197 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
107. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Buying Commercial: An Introduction and Framework, 27
PUB. CONT. L.J. 249, 256 (1998) (reporting that by switching to a single national contract
for the purchase of a particular pharmaceutical, the Department of Veterans Affairs re-
duced its cost from $2.5 million to $500,000).
108. See supra notes 106 and 107.
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in the manner that Bayer and others are doing now.10 9 But sales to a
government agency for domestic needs would probably more closely ap-
proximate national needs than the present system that depends upon the
manufacturer's estimates and sets of distributors that are actively trying
to misinform the manufacturer in the interest of securing larger supplies
for export to higher-priced states.
This approach would be consistent with the incentive structure of pat-
ent law. The incentive structure of patent law is premised upon the mar-
ket. There is no assumption that bargaining cannot take place in the
market. Indeed, the exclusive rights accorded to the patentees assumes
that the patentees will bargain hard in their dealings with licensees and
customers. Conversely, the market premise of patent law is also consis-
tent with hard bargaining by customers, especially large customers. The
attraction of this possible middle approach is that it is fully consistent
with the incentive structure of patent law, that it is supportive of a com-
mon market in pharmaceuticals, and that it respects policy differences
among the member states.
Under the middle-ground approach advocated here, each nation of the
European Union that wished to intervene in the market for pharmaceuti-
cal products would do so through negotiation and bargaining with the
pharmaceutical companies over prices, terms of sale, dates of delivery,
and quantities purchased. Other purchasers (i.e., nongovernmental pur-
chasers) would also be free to negotiate with the pharmaceutical compa-
nies as well. As explained, this scenario would likely produce results no
less favorable to consumers than those now obtaining in the various
member states of the European Union. Yet this scenario would also be
more compatible with a common market
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE FUNCTIONING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS: THE DOUBLE
EDGE OF JUDICIAL TREATMENTS
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
Biotechnology innovation has been protected in the United States by
the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (providing protection for asexually repro-
duced plants) 1 ° and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act (extending
protection to sexually reproduced plants).1 1 The Supreme Court's 1980
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty12 upheld the patentability under the
general patent law of genetically-engineered organisms, thus, fostering
the development of the biotechnology industry. In the wake of
Chakrabarty, the critical issues affecting biotechnology patents have been
resolved in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
109. See supra note 94.
110. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2004).
111. 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (2004).
112. 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
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European and American laws governing patents in general and bio-
technology inventions in particular employ similar concepts. Both sets of
laws require novelty and a substantial advance before providing protec-
tion to an invention,113 and both employ the concept of a skilled profes-
sional in the relevant field as a baseline for measuring the substantiality
of that advance.1 14 Nonetheless, the two systems appear to operate quite
differently and to embrace significantly different policies.
The United States law has entwined the protection of biotechnology
advances in a doctrinal mix involving description, enablement, obvi-
ousness and equivalence. Thus, like the European law, the United States
patent law extends protection only to inventions that are "non-obvi-
ous,"1 15 inventions which are beyond the ability of a skilled professional
working in the field. Like the European law, it also requires that a patent
application contain a written description of the invention in terms that
are sufficiently clear and precise as to enable a skilled person to make
and use it.116 In the United States, these traditional requirements of pat-
entability have taken on some new characteristics as they apply to
biotechnology.
Much of the work in biotechnology involves the DNA structure and its
relation to the creation of proteins. DNA is essentially the blueprint used
by living organisms to create the proteins needed in the process of life.
The Federal Circuit has taken a two-pronged approach to the patentabil-
ity of DNA molecular structure. First, the court has taken the position
that a DNA structure which cannot be described cannot be obvious.1 17
This approach, in combination with the redundancy of the genetic code,
has meant that DNA structures have been treated as nonobvious and
therefore patentable, even though the corresponding amino acid struc-
ture of the related protein was generally known.1 18 Knowledge of the
113. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004) (novelty), § 103 (nonobviousness); European Patent Con-
vention ("EPC"), art. 54 (novelty), art 52(1) (inventive step).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004); EPC, art. 56.
115. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See EPC, arts. 52(1), 56.
116. Section 111(A) requires the patent application to contain a specification as pre-
scribed by § 112. 35 U.S.C. § 111(A) (2004). Section 112 requires that the specification
contain a "written description" of the invention "and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same .... 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004). The latter is commonly referred to as the enablement
requirement. The European analogue to § 112 is EPC art. 83, which requires the applica-
tion to "disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be
carried out by a person skilled in the art." Its description requirement is contained in EPC,
art. 80(d). As in § 112, the EPC requires that the claims be supported by the description.
See EPC, art. 84.
117. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("What cannot be contemplated or
conceived cannot be obvious."); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In incorpo-
rating the description requirement into the nonobviousness standard, the Federal Circuit
has, in effect, lowered the standard of nonobviousness and thereby facilitated patent
grants. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 55 (1992) (advocating a modest reduction in the nonobviousness standard in areas of
high-cost research to encourage such research).
118. In re Deuel, supra note 117; In re Bell, supra note 117.
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protein structure does not reveal the actual DNA structure, because a
potentially wide variety of DNA structures might theoretically produce
the given protein structure. This part of the Federal Circuit's approach,
which has facilitated the patenting of DNA molecular structure, 119 has
provided support to the biotechnology industry, encouraging work on the
identification and isolation of a multitude of DNA structures.
The second prong of the court's approach, however, may produce an
opposite effect. In a mirror image of its approach to the obviousness of a
DNA structure, the court has read § 112's description provision as requir-
ing, as a condition of patentability, that each link in the claimed DNA
segment be identified. Thus, for example, in the Eli Lilly case, 120 the
University of California had claimed patents on the DNA structure for
human insulin, vertebrate insulin and mammalian insulin. The Univer-
sity's claim for human insulin failed because the specification lacked a
written description of its subject matter. 121 The University had described
only the cDNA of rat insulin in its specification, along with a method for
obtaining human cDNA plus the amino acid sequences of human insulin
A and B chains. 122 The court ruled that whether or not this disclosure was
enabling, it was deficient because it did not "provide a written description
of the cDNA encoding human insulin,"12 3 and thus, failed to satisfy the
description requirement in §112. The University's claims for vertebrate
and mammalian insulin also failed the written description requirement
because the specification contained a description only of the cDNA of a
species (rat insulin) and not of either of the claimed genera. 124
These failures to describe the DNA structures rendered the Univer-
sity's claims invalid, even though the court conceded that its patent appli-
cation may have supplied information sufficient to enable a skilled
professional to obtain human insulin.125 The Federal Circuit's emphasis
upon a full description of the molecular structure is an outgrowth of its
approach to chemical patents, especially those involving inorganic com-
119. Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that while lowering the standard of
nonobviousness is good policy towards fields afflicted by uncertainty and high research
costs, the uncertainty and costs afflicting the biotechnology industry is not generally at the
stage of the initial research that produces the invention but, at the post-patent stage in
bringing the product through the hurdle of FDA regulation to market. They therefore
urge that the Federal Circuit adopt a very different approach to biotechnology inventions
than the one that they have been following. They urge a reduced description requirement
and high standards of nonobviousness. This approach would produce fewer but more valu-
able patents. The higher-value patents would facilitate the investment needed to navigate
through the post-patent development stage, and the lower number of patents would avoid
anticommons problems that might be generated by a multiplicity of DNA patents. Dan L.
Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1680-83
(2003).
120. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
121. Id. at 1567.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1567-68.
125. Id. at 1567 ("Whether or not [the specification] provides an enabling disclosure, it
does not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin .... ).
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pounds or simpler organic compounds. In dealing with ordinary chemical
compounds, the court rightly has insisted upon a complete description of
molecular structure and has been more willing to infer obviousness when
the claimed compound is structurally similar to one or more previously
known compounds. t2 6 Its refusal to draw the same inferences of obvi-
ousness in the case of DNA is based in the greater complexity of DNA
structure and its redundancy. Yet, while the court recognizes the differ-
ences between DNA and non-DNA structures for purposes of obvi-
ousness, it imposes the same description requirements for both DNA and
non-DNA compounds.1 27
The court's critics believe that this approach to the description require-
ment places biotechnology companies in a difficult position that may in-
hibit their research activities. 128 If a company rushes its discovery to the
patent office, it may be able to obtain a patent only upon one variety of a
DNA structure for a beneficial protein, while enabling its competitors to
use its research-now publicly revealed in its patent-to produce unpro-
tected equivalents. Yet, delay may mean that a rival will either identify
the DNA sequence on another variety or even the DNA sequences com-
mon to the genus. Either way, the risk that research results will be eco-
nomically unprotectable is increased. Concomitantly, the incentives to
research are undermined.
The problem of the Eli Lilly case results from the greater stringency
placed upon the description requirement relative to the enablement re-
quirement. Yet, the ability to describe is not unrelated to enablement.
At least in the case of the claim involving human insulin, the claim failure
appears to have been the fault of the University. 129 But will the ruling in
that case generate other decisions that discourage research as the critics
fear? That is, will the decision delay patent filing? Will it foster an envi-
ronment in which rivals "free-ride" off of an innovator's research by pro-
ducing slightly different but similarly-functioning DNA molecules? In
United States patent law, the judicially-developed doctrine of equivalents
has been the primary mechanism designed to protect patentees against
free-riding on another's invention in situations in which the other does
not literally infringe.130 But the scope of the doctrine of equivalents is in
126. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
127. Eli Lilly, supra note 120, at 1566-67.
128. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691, 736-38 (2004) (arguing that the present severe description
requirement unduly limits the scope of biotechnology patents; and that the biotechnology
industry would benefit from a policy under which the standards for nonobviousness were
raised and the scope of issued patents were widened).
129. If its disclosure enabled the production of the cDNA for human insulin, then, with
some additional 'work, it could have supplied the required description.
130. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). See
also Steven H. VerSteen, Parallel Applications to Preserve the Doctrine of Equivalents in a
Post Festo World, 84. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 341, 353 (2002) (noting that the
doctrine of equivalents prevents ... freeriding by a competitor.")
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doubt and its future is cloudy. 31
Traditionally, an invention is the equivalent of another if it is structur-
ally the same and one or more elements-although literally different
from the patented invention-are interchangeable with the elements re-
cited in the claim, and the interchangeability would be known by a skilled
professional. 132 Recent cases, however, have introduced complications
into that doctrine. The courts have been concerned that a patentee might
intentionally narrow its claims while it is seeking Patent Office approval
and then later, in the context of an infringement suit, seek to recover
what it had surrendered through a judicial application of the doctrine of
equivalents.1 33 In order to prevent this kind of strategic behavior, the
courts have created the doctrine of prosecution estoppel, which bars such
a patentee from using the equivalence doctrine to recover the protection
that it had earlier surrendered in negotiations with the Patent Office.134
The doctrine of equivalents was recently applied at the protein level to
an Amgen composition of erythropoietin glycoprotein.135 In that case,
Amgen had mistakenly claimed a protein with a 166 amino-acid se-
quence.1 36 The protein initially possessed a 166 sequence, but at the time
that it became ready to perform its work in the body, it had shed one
sequence. The alleged infringer had produced a protein with the 165
amino-acid sequence that performed similarly to Amgen's. Because the
rival's product lacked one of the amino acids identified in Amgen's claim,
it did not literally infringe. Nonetheless, the district court upheld
Amgen's infringement claim under the doctrine of equivalents. 137
Yet, the doctrine of equivalents ultimately proved unavailable to
Amgen.138 During the patent prosecution, Amgen amended its applica-
tion to distinguish its claims from another patent that had already been
issued to it. Because this amendment was not made for any reason re-
lated to the statutory patent requirements, the district court found the
amendment innocuous. 139 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit ruled
that this amendment-because it was made for a patent related reason-
estopped Amgen from using the doctrine of equivalents. 140 The appellate
decision in Amgen thus suggests that the doctrine of equivalents may po-
131. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Ltd., 535 U.S. 722
(2002); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
132. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
133. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733-34; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997).
134. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 733-34; Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 30-31.
135. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 99-100 (D. Mass.
2001), aff d in part and rev'd in part, 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
136. See 314 F.3d at 1343 ("At the time the patent was drafted, it was believed that the
sequence included 166 amino acids. ... In fact, the full sequence was actually 165 amino
acids; the last (arginine) is actually cleaved off prior to the protein's secretion from the
cell.").
137. Id. at 1344.
138. 314 F. 3d at 1345.
139. 126 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
140. 314 F.3d at 1345.
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tentially have a more limited applicability than it has previously been un-
derstood to possess. Because of the complex structural characteristics of
DNA and protein, the current incarnations of the doctrines of obvi-
ousness, and the recently enhanced description requirement appear to
leave DNA and protein claims vulnerable to free-riding, in the absence of
strong protection under the doctrine of equivalents. The erosion of the
latter doctrine, therefore, appears to strike at the heart of biotech patent
protection.
The European approach to biotechnology patents appears so far to
have avoided the doctrinal morass of the American decisions. In several
decisions the Technical Board of Appeal has upheld biotech patents that
made broad claims that were cast in functional language, 141 indicating
that the European system may be more encouraging of biotechnical re-
search than the U.S. system. 142 Some decisions of the European Technical
Board of Appeal appear to be sensitive to the dilemma generated by the
Ely Lilly decision. In Biogen/Recombinant DNA, for example, the Board
justified the use of functional language on the ground that "[u]nless
claims with such functional connotations are allowable, no worthwhile
protection is provided against a third-party which faithfully repeats the
process of the patent and obtains new but equally useful variants of the
invention. ' ' 143 Yet, while tolerant of functional language, the European
system is careful to limit protection-like United States law-to the
scope of that which can be enabled. The difference then is that the
United States system adds an enhanced description requirement. 144 If
this enhanced description requirement does inhibit research as the critics
fear, then United States courts will have made a wrong turn in the Eli
Lilly case. 145
A stylized version of this problem can be represented as follows: The
number of vertebrates is n, and thus, the number of vertebrate insulin
DNA structures is also n. A patent covering the genus of vertebrate
DNA structures would extend to all n structures. Because a patent of
generic scope could not be easily avoided, its value would be the present
value of the income stream generated by the use of DNA for the produc-
141. See Genentech I/Polypeptide Expression, [1989] E.P.O.R. 1, 7 (1988) ("It follows
that the features may generically embrace the use of unknown or not yet envisaged pos-
sibilities, including specific variants which might be provided or invented in the future.");
Biogen/Recombinant DNA, [1990] E.P.O.R. 190, 202 (1989) ("Unless claims with such
functional connotations are allowable, no worthwhile protection is provided against a
third-party which faithfully repeats the process of the patent and obtains new but equally
useful variants of the invention."). See also Mycogen, [1998] E.P.O.R. 114, 120, 125 (1996).
The reader will observe that this approach is consistent with the policy recommendations
of Burk and Lemley for biotechnology patent policy. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 119.
142. See, e.g., Li WESTERLUND, BIOTECH PATENTS: EQUIVALENCY AND EXCLUSIONS
UNDER EUROPEAN AND US PATENT LAW 121-23 (2002) (discussing Eli Lilly and compar-
ing the strictness of European and United States approaches to biotechnology patents).
143. [1990] E.P.O.R. at 202.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004).
145. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
2004] 1363
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion of insulin of all types. Assuming that stream is m dollars per year,
that value could be represented as follows:
20
X $m/(l+r)'.
i=3
But a patent relating to the DNA of only one species would have a
scope of only 1/n of the genus patent. Since, in theory, (n-1)/n of the
scope of the genus patent would be open to rivals to produce freely, the
initial species patent would represent exclusive rights over only an insig-
nificant share of the commercially valuable genus. Indeed, it is possible
that, following the doctrine that what cannot be described cannot be ob-
vious, the rivals might each patent their own DNA variants. In any case,
the market in insulin would be transformed into a fully competitive mar-
ket and the initial patentee and its rivals would compete away their rents.
Thus, the incentives for research provided by the patent system would be
illusory.
Because DNA patents are a relatively new phenomenon, it is to be
expected that new issues will emerge in the application of preexisting
doctrine. To a large extent, as the preceding discussion has shown, these
are issues of patent scope arising under the rubrics of obviousness, en-
ablement, description, and equivalents. They involve the courts in work-
ing out the interrelationships among these doctrines in ways that fit the
complexities of the DNA contexts. They are not easy tasks, yet the wel-
fare goals underlying the patent system can sometimes provide needed
guidance. As the courts come to a better understanding of the technol-
ogy, they will be better able to formulate these various doctrines in ways
that support (rather than undermine) the incentive structure of the patent
system.
V. THE SCOPE OF COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ANTI-COMMONS
Although computer programs currently receive protection in the
United States under both patent and copyright laws, that has not always
been the case. The protection of computer programs in the United States
did not begin until the 1980s. 146 During the previous decade, patent pro-
tection appeared to be unavailable, as the Supreme Court caselaw ap-
peared to be saying that patentable subject matter did not include
"mathematical algorithms,"'147 suggesting to many observers that com-
puter programs could not be protected under patent law. Moreover, the
1976 revision of United States copyright law contained no provision pro-
tecting computer programming. Only in 1980 did Congress amend the
146. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
147. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
72 (1972).
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copyright law to provide protection for computer programs. 148 And, only
in 1981 did the Supreme Court relax its hostility towards the protection of
computer programs under patent law.1 49
The Court's more tolerant attitude towards computer programs was ex-
pressed, in 1981, in its Diamond v. Diehr decision that upheld the patent-
ability of a process for curing rubber inside a mold, even though a
component of the process involved a computer (using a well-known
mathematical formula) to continuously update the curing time as a result
of temperature inputs from within the mold.150 In Diehr, the Court char-
acterized the patent as pertaining to an industrial process and, thus, to
subject matter that has been traditionally protected by patent law.151 Be-
cause the computer program in Diehr was only a part of a larger process,
the Court was able to uphold the patentability of the process without
repudiating its earlier assertions that algorithms themselves were unpro-
tectable. The Diehr decision then made possible the Federal Circuit's ag-
gressive protection of computer programs throughout the 1990s.
In 1994, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent for transforming discrete
electronic inputs into a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope,
despite the fact that the invention consisted almost (if not quite entirely)
of a computer algorithm.152 The court, however, reasoned that computer
programming can transform general purpose computers into specialized
machines to perform particular functions. 153 In this case, the program-
ming transformed discrete data into a smooth curve on a standard moni-
toring device. 154 Extending the scope of patentable programming even
further, the court in its 1998 State Street Bank decision upheld the patent-
ability of a computer program for implementing a financial structure for
mutual funds. 155
Most computer programs, when protectable under patent law, receive
their protection at a higher level of abstraction than simple machine or
source code. 156 Patent applications involving computer programs are
generally stated in means-plus-function language, in an effort to obtain
protection that includes the implementation of a functional element of
the invention by any computer program, a strategy that will succeed so
long as the patent office and the courts view inventions incorporating
other programs implementing that function as equivalents. Because both
the patent office and the courts currently view most programming as the
implementation of a simple skill common to all or most programmers,
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2004).
149. 450 U.S. at 185.
150. 450 U.S. at 185.
151. Id.
152. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
156. See discussion of standards for software patents in Burk & Lemley, supra note 119,
at 1688.
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and because patentees rarely describe their programs at the level of
source code in the patent specifications, this strategy is likely to be suc-
cessful. In this context, the difficulties that the Supreme Court had ex-
perienced in the past over the protection of algorithms are minimized,
because it is not the particular algorithm that generally constitutes the
patented invention; rather, the invention consists in the performance of
the function by that or any equivalent algorithm.
Protection for computer programming at the level of code and code
structure is generally a function of copyright law. 157 Computer programs
are treated as "literary works" under United States copyright law, 158 an
approach that, given the essentially utilitarian nature of programming, is
somewhat at odds with the tradition of copyright as the protector of the
literary and artistic. Yet, copyright protection has the advantage of nar-
row protection. Copyright protection does not extend to ideas 1 59 reserv-
ing protection for major innovations to patent law. Moreover, because it
protects only against copying, the copyright regime guarantees freedom
for independent creation. A major social disadvantage to copyright pro-
tection of computer programs, however, is the extensive period of protec-
tion, a period that at least in the case of programming is far too long.160
The lack of copyright protection for computer programs in the 1970s
was particularly unfortunate because the personal computer industry was
in its gestation and early stages of growth during this period, and software
firms were vulnerable to free-riding. 161 Another consequence of the ab-
sence of copyright protection for software was the exposure of operating
systems to fragmentation, a potential that was realized in the case of the
Unix operating system, developed by American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. in its Bell Laboratories in the 1970s. Unix was extensively employed
by many firms and individuals, many of whom introduced their own mod-
ifications to the program, with the result that various versions of Unix
emerged. This created a circumstance in which one version would not
necessarily interact with other versions, at least without problems.' 62 Be-
cause operating systems become more useful and hence valuable as their
common-user base increases, Unix-despite its great value-has fallen
short of its potential.
Here, accordingly, was another market failure and one that was the
direct result of the absence of an effective intellectual property regime.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2004).
158. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 102(6) (2004).
160. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2004) (life of author plus 70 years; 95 years from first publica-
tion for work-for-hire, anonymous work, or pseudonymous work).
161. See Bill Gates, An Open Letter to Lobbyists, in STEPHEN MANES & PAUL AN-
DREWS, GATES: How MICROSoFr's MOGUL REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY AND MADE HIM-
SELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 91-92 (1993). The incident giving rise to Gates' letter
is described in John Markoff, A Tale of the Tape From the Days When it Was Still Micro
Soft, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000 at C1.
162. Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Indus-
tries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 87 (2001).
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In the so-called new economy, certain kinds of software-especially oper-
ating systems-possess characteristics that facilitate user interaction with
each other and with commonly-used software application programs. As a
result, widespread use of the same operating system creates a virtual net-
work that increases the software's value as its user base increases. Frag-
mentation of the operating system erodes, shrinks or destroys that virtual
network, erasing the value that it would otherwise have possessed. It is
one of the functions of intellectual property rights to protect network-
generating software against the kinds of modifications that threaten the
network. Unix's potential as network-generating software was eroded
because Bell Laboratories was unable to assert control over the modifica-
tions. The 1980 legislation that provided copyright protection to software
created the property rights that are essential to guarding against fragmen-
tation.163 Today, the Microsoft Corporation asserts control over its Win-
dows operating system through copyright and other intellectual property
rights, preventing users from modifying it in ways that undermine its use-
fulness as an operating system. Similarly, Sun Microsystems, Inc. uses
copyright and trademark certification to protect its Java platform from
fragmenting. 164 Copyright is even being employed to rehabilitate Unix as
AT&T and Sun attempt to reassert control over that software. 165
Even after Congress provided copyright protection to software, the
scope of that protection remained uncertain. It took a number of years
for the courts to work out standards of protection that met the industry's
needs. Initially, the scope of protection that copyrighted programs re-
ceived from the courts was far too broad. In 1987, the Third Circuit in
Whelan166 took the position that the purpose or function of the program
was its unprotectable idea, and that everything else constituted protect-
able expression. Five years later, however, the Second Circuit in Altai167
modified Whelan's approach by identifying the purpose of each routine
and subroutine of the larger program as an unprotectable "idea." Then,
the elements of the routine or subroutine that implemented their pur-
poses would be protectable so long as they were not required for efficient
operation, were not standard routines in common use, and were not re-
163. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2004).
164. Sun's concerns over fragmentation underlay its litigation with Microsoft, its com-
plaints about the latter to the Justice Department. Sun saw Microsoft's creation of a Win-
dow's specific version of Java and Microsoft's handling of Java's native calls as generating
fragmentation that ultimately would destroy Java as an alternative platform. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999), vacating
and remanding 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See also Sun Microsystems, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996-97, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (on remand). The
Justice Department also shared these concerns. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 105-110 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings 386-407).
165. Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998). See
also discussion in ROBERT AXELROD ET AL., Setting Standards: Coalition Formation in
Standard-Setting Alliances in THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 96, 107 (Robert Axelrod
ed., 1997).
166. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
167. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
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quired for external reasons, such as the requirements of the hardware. 168
The court described this kind of analysis as an abstraction-filtration-com-
parison test. 169 First, the court followed an abstraction approach by iden-
tifying several levels (routines, subroutines, etc.) where it would perform
the rest of its analysis. 170 At each level the court identified the unprotect-
able idea and the elements that were unprotectable for reasons of effi-
ciency, standard usage, external constraints or public domain, and filtered
them out.171 Then the court compared what was left, the protectable ele-
ments, with the corresponding elements of the accused program, to deter-
mine the extent (if any) of infringement. 172
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test narrows copyright protection
significantly. As a consequence, the potential for copyrights in existing
programs to interfere with efforts of programmers in constructing new
programs is minimized. Built into the Altai test is permission to use
whatever is necessary for efficiency reasons and to employ all of the stan-
dardized modules familiar to programmers. 173 And, of course, program-
mers can legitimately employ whatever is necessary for the hardware or
for interoperability. While remaining faithful to the law's prohibition
against copying, the court in Altai also ensured that copyright law will not
be employed to create barriers to creativity. Indeed, the problem sym-
bolized by the anti-commons-impediments to innovation raised by an
abundance of preexisting intellectual property rights-appears to have
been minimized by that decision and its progeny.
The potential for copyright to reduce social value (rather than to en-
courage the creation of new social value) has been further lowered as a
result of both caselaw and legislation that allow reverse engineering of
computer programs for the purpose of achieving interoperability. Several
decisions now recognize that right. 174 In the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, 175 Congress included a provision excluding reverse engineering
for achieving interoperability from its otherwise general prohibitions
against circumvention of copyright protection systems.
The First Circuit's Lotus decision further constrains the ability of copy-
168. Id. at 707-10.
169. Id. at 706-12.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 707-09.
174. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectrix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993)
also supports the broad proposition that the courts have not favored the use of copyright to
exclude products produced by others from interacting with protected software.
175. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2004). In its provisions prohibiting the circumvention of copy-
right protection systems, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act included an exception for
reverse engineering for the purpose of achieving interoperability.
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right to reduce social value. 176 In Lotus, a rival had copied the command
structure of the Lotus spreadsheet program to reduce the learning costs
that would be imposed upon users of Lotus who wished to switch to the
rival's spreadsheet program. 177 No social purpose would be advanced by
protecting the command structure. 178 Indeed, protecting the command
structure would have conflicted with the law's manifest purpose of en-
couraging programming; the law has no purpose of encouraging the im-
position of learning costs upon consumers. The Lotus decision highlights
the coincidence of copyright protection with the furtherance of social
welfare. 179
In short, the phenomenon of the anti-commons identified in the litera-
ture is a theoretical construct in which intellectual property rights work
perversely by creating barriers to innovation. At least in the copyright
protection of computer programs, this possibility seems to be minimized
by caselaw that limits the extent to which programs are protectable. The
abstraction-filtration-comparison test of infringement appears to bar the
protection of programming elements that are required by other program-
mers; a line of cases explicitly allows copying necessary to achieving pro-
gram interoperability; and the Lotus decision-by denying protection
where aggregate social value would be reduced by protection-provides
confirmation that the courts will resolve most disputed issues in copyright
coverage in a way that furthers, rather than reduces, social welfare.180
Patent protection, however, raises more difficult problems. In an in-
vention in which the computer program performs a function that is only
one out of several functional elements, as in the rubber-curing invention
involved in Diamond v. Diehr,181 the computer program remains availa-
ble for use by others in different contexts. But, where the primary opera-
tional element of the invention is the program and that program has only
one highly specialized use, as in State Street Bank,'82 where the program
determined and allocated investment fund values, not only that program,
but all other programs performing the same function may well be off-
limits to other inventors. Note that the patentee does not ordinarily de-
scribe the program in its specification at the level of source code.183
Rather, the program is usually described in terms of its structure which
itself often takes the form of describing relationships between various
176. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd, 516 U.S.
233 (1996).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. In their discussion of patent law, Burk and Lemley expressed the concern that
because software develops through incremental improvements, small improvements should
be protected. Burk & Lemley, supra note 119, at 1689. That function may be presently
performed by copyright law.
181. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
182. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
183. See supra note 156.
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functions. 184 Thus, the higher the level of structural description con-
tained in the specification, the broader is the range of actual programs
that will fall within the scope of equivalents to it.
Yet, unexplored areas of patent law may limit what potentially would
otherwise be too broad an area of protection. It is only the equivalents of
the program that are treated as an element of the protected invention.
The traditional test for equivalence is satisfied when "[an alternative] per-
forms substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain the same result." 18 5 If an alternative program is sufficiently struc-
turally different as to negate equivalency under the triple-identity test,
then a rival device employing the alternative program will not infringe.1 86
In context, this would be the case when the alternative program produced
the same result but in a structurally different "way." Thus, although pat-
ent protection of computer programs possesses the potential for overpro-
tection,1 87 there is a little room for maneuver. The extent to which this
theoretical room for maneuver can in fact be realized awaits further de-
velopment of the caselaw.
VI. RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF EXCLUSIVE
RIGHTS UNDER MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAWS:
WELFARE EFFECTS
Both the patent and copyright misuse doctrines are judicial creations
designed to prevent intellectual property rights from being used contrary
to the purposes of those laws. The misuse doctrine entered patent law in
the first quarter of the twentieth century as a judicial attempt to incorpo-
rate antitrust concerns into the patent law.188 It was in this context that
the courts developed the language that condemned an attempt to "ex-
tend" a patent beyond the terms of its grant. 189 The courts generally con-
ceptualized misuse as the leveraging of the "monopoly" conferred by a
patent into a second market where the patentee uses its power over the
patented product to compel a purchaser (or licensee) to purchase (or li-
cense) a second product. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the
courts adopted a copyright misuse doctrine modeled upon the earlier pat-
ent misuse doctrine.
184. See id.
185. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citing
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)); see also Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wheland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
186. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 833 F.2d at 608-09.
187. Overprotection of software is one of the concerns raised by Burk & Lemley. See
Burk & Lemley, supra note 119, at 1688-89.
188. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1917)
(referring to policies embodied in Clayton Act § 3 in process of overruling Henry v. A.B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)). See Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust's Troubled Relations with
Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1705-08 (2003)(describing development of the
misuse doctrine).
189. Motion Picture Patents Co., supra note 188, at 429; Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am.
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-35 (1931).
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A. PATENT MISUSE
The patent misuse doctrine reached its apogee in the Mercoid cases of
the 1940s. 190 In those cases the Supreme Court condemned practices em-
ployed in marketing thermostats by the Honeywell Corporation. Honey-
well sold thermostats in packages that carried a license authorizing
purchasers to construct certain patented heating systems. 191 The Court
characterized this marketing as involving the patented heating system as
the tying product and the thermostat as the tied product.192 It then con-
demned the arrangement in sweeping terms. 193 Indeed, the Court's rhet-
oric was so broad that it undermined the doctrine of contributory
infringement, a patent doctrine dating back into the nineteenth century.
In response, Congress enacted legislation restoring the doctrine of con-
tributory infringement and imposing stringent limits on the development
and application of the misuse doctrine by the courts.1 94
These legislative constraints on the misuse doctrine have enabled pat-
entees to better exploit their patents. Often, arrangements that the
courts have conceptualized as problematic tying arrangements have in
fact been dictated by the practicalities of marketing and have been effi-
ciency-enhancing. In the Mercoid cases, for example, the Court con-
demned as misuse and unlawful tying the sale of unpatented thermostats
together with licenses to use the thermostats in the construction of pat-
ented heating systems.195 In so doing, the Court effectively ignored Hon-
eywell's inherent expertise in manufacturing thermostats. Society's
welfare would not be enhanced by requiring Honeywell to market heat-
ing systems. Indeed, the customers were likely to be able to install the
heating system more efficiently than Honeywell, or to be able to contract
with an efficient installer. 196 In Rohm & Haas,197 the company possessed
a patent over the use of propanil as a herbicide. The patentee was best
able to market its process by selling propanil to farmers, together with a
license to use it as an herbicide. 198 Indeed, this method of marketing
minimizes distribution costs. No social purpose would be furthered by
requiring the company to sell process licenses to farmers. 199
In short, the dimensions of the misuse doctrine changed over time in
accordance with changes in institutional understandings of social welfare.
First, the courts created the misuse doctrine to condemn tying arrange-
190. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
191. The patented heating systems involved a furnace, thermostat, and furnace over-
ride. See 320 U.S. at 664.
192. See id. at 666-67.
193. See id. at 667-68, 678.
194. See 66 Stat. 811, ch. 950 (1952). That legislation and its subsequent amendment
have given us the present § 271 of the patent act. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2004).
195. See Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 666; Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 684.
196. Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 661; Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 680.
197. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980).
198. Id. at 183.
199. Id.
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ments that they viewed as reducing social welfare.200 Later, Congress
modified that doctrine when it concluded that at least some tying ar-
rangements were legitimate for the exploitation of patents.201
B. COPYRIGHT MISUSE
In its 1990 Lasercomb decision,20 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit resurrected the doctrine of copyright misuse, which
had been largely neglected up to that time. Asserting that the copyright
law was sufficiently similar to the patent law to justify incorporating a
copyright analogue to patent misuse, the court justified its new doctrine,
to a large extent, on the basis of the judicial decisions that had created the
patent misuse doctrine. 20 3 Yet the court did not feel constrained by the
legislative limits that Congress had placed on patent misuse. Moreover,
the court construed its new doctrine expansively. Under the court's ap-
proach a copyright is misused-and therefore unenforceable-whenever
it is licensed with a restriction that the court deems to impose a re-
straint.20 4 Thus, in the Lasercomb case, the owner of a copyright on cad/
cam software (computer aided design-computer aided manufacturing) li-
censed it to a manufacturing company, providing in the licensing agree-
ment that during the term of the agreement the licensee would be
prohibited from designing cad/cam software.20 5 The licensor justified the
restriction on the ground that it helped to protect itself against licensees
who sought to divert its work product for their own use. The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, rejected that justification, asserting that no rule-of-reason
defense should be recognized in the application of the misuse doctrine. 20 6
In a later case, the Ninth Circuit followed that approach, finding misuse
where the copyright owner had entered into an exclusive licensing agree-
ment with a licensee. 20 7
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, THE MISUSE DOCTRINES
AND SOCIAL WELFARE
When the courts initially created the misuse doctrine, they were at-
tempting to ensure that the exclusive rights conferred by the intellectual
property laws would not be "extended" beyond the scope that Congress
intended. That is another way of saying that-given the assumptions of
200. Mercoid Corp. 320 U.S. at 661; Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 680.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2004).
202. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
203. Id. at 976-77.
204. See id. at 979.
205. Id. at 978.
206. Id. at 977.
207. Practice Mgmt. Info. Co. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (1997). The Third
Circuit has recently indicated that it is taking a less expansive approach to the doctrine of
copyright misuse. See Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191,
203-06 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 410 (2004).
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intellectual property law 208-the courts were attempting to prevent the
intellectual property laws from being used perversely to reduce, rather
than to advance, aggregate social welfare. Consistent with this approach,
the courts took an aggressively expansive approach to patent misuse dur-
ing a period in which tying arrangements (which were the primary subject
of the misuse doctrine) were deemed to lack social value. During the last
half century, economists have come to recognize social value in tying ar-
rangements, and coincidently, Congress has cut back the courts' powers
to condemn tying arrangements in the patent context.20 9
The creation of a copyright misuse doctrine by the courts in the 1990s
can also be viewed as an effort by the courts to ensure that copyright not
be employed to reduce social welfare. Yet, except for a qualification that
I will introduce below, that effort was largely mistaken. The most signifi-
cant application of the copyright misuse doctrine has been with software,
and, in this area, the potential of copyright to reduce social value inheres
in whatever capacity it possesses for creating an anti-commons or other-
wise to impede the creation of new programming works. But, we have
seen that the courts construe the application of copyright law to software
as to minimize that potential.210 The development of the abstraction-fil-
tration-comparison test of infringement; the aggressive use of the fair use
doctrine to foster program interoperability; and the overall openness to
resolving copyright issues so as to further aggregate social value work in
this direction. As a result of this enlightened approach to copyright inter-
pretation, the need for a copyright misuse doctrine has been significantly
reduced.
D. INNOVATION AND TYING IN AMERICAN AND
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
1. Under United States Antitrust Law
In the mid-1990s, the United States Justice Department and the Euro-
pean Commission questioned licensing and other practices of the
Microsoft Corporation. These enforcement agencies were particularly
concerned about Microsoft's custom of licensing its operating systems to
computer manufacturers at a lump sum amount keyed to the estimated
production capacity of the licensee. This practice was often referred to as
208. The relevant assumptions of intellectual property law are that the grant of an ex-
clusive right for the statutory period generates the incentive to create new products that
adds to aggregate welfare more than the cumulative deadweight loss detracts. In deciding
upon the lengths of the patent and copyright terms, Congress is making the judgment that
the social balance is positive. Judicial judgments about "extensions" as constituting misuse
can be understood as judicial judgments about aggregate social welfare, given the legisla-
tive judgments about term length and other aspects of the tradeoff.
209. Not only has Congress restricted the patent misuse doctrine but the courts them-
selves have brought the patent misuse doctrine into close alignment with antitrust law by
requiring that an impact on competition be shown as a condition for applying that doctrine.
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
905 (1986); see supra note 194.
210. See supra notes 149-96 and accompanying text.
2004] 1373
SMU LAW REVIEW
a "per-processor" license, since the fee was calculated solely by the num-
ber of processors cmployed by the licensee.211 Because a computer man-
ufacturer paid for a Microsoft operating system license for each computer
that it produced, regardless of whether a Microsoft operating system was
actually installed on that computer, manufacturers were discouraged
from installing rival operating systems. Any manufacturer that did so
would have to pay twice for an operating system license: once to
Microsoft under the per-processor arrangement and once to the rival op-
erating system producer.
After the Justice Department challenged these practices in an antitrust
action,212 a three-way settlement was reached between the Justice De-
partment and the European Commission on one side and Microsoft on
the other. Under the settlement, Microsoft agreed to discontinue the per-
processor licensing practice. 213 Microsoft was permitted to issue bulk li-
censes for identifiable lines of computers, so long as these lines did not
encompass all of the licensee's production. 214 The settlement also gave
rise to later antitrust litigation between Microsoft and the Justice
Department.215
The settlement prohibited Microsoft from "tying" one product to an-
other, but permitted Microsoft to integrate two products together. 21 6 As
the D.C. Circuit later explained, this provision was written against a back-
ground that involved complaints by Digital Equipment to the European
Commission about Microsoft "tying" its Windows 3.1 graphical user in-
terface to its MS-DOS operating system.217 In the negotiations over the
settlement terms, Microsoft-which had integrated the graphical user in-
terface into its operating system in Windows 95-insisted that product in-
tegration be permitted.21 8 And, the enforcement agencies agreed.219
Subsequently, the Justice Department, contending that Microsoft had
violated the consent degree by tying its Internet Explorer browser to its
Windows operating system, instituted a proceeding to hold that company
in contempt. 220 Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of Microsoft on the ground
that the browser appeared to be tied so closely to the operating system
that they were integrated (and thus protected) within the meaning of the
211. See Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Department, and Antitrust
Theory, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 621, 632 (1996).
212. Complaint $$ 19-20, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. A. 94-1564, 1995 WL
505998, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995). See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D.
318, 321 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
213. See 1995 WL 505998, at *3.
214. Id. See definition of "per system license" at *2. See Gifford, supra note 211, at
643.
215. See infra note 232.
216. See 1995 WL 505998, at *3.
217. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997).
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consent decree. 221
The Justice Department's loss of the contempt proceeding did not end
its challenge to Microsoft's marketing of its browser. Shortly after the
D.C. Circuit's decision in the contempt proceeding, the Justice Depart-
ment brought a new antitrust action, charging that Microsoft's bundling
of its browser with its operating system constituted both an unlawful tying
arrangement under section one of the Sherman Act as well as monopoli-
zation and attempted monopolization under section two.2 22 Although the
court of appeals ultimately upheld a ruling that Microsoft had indeed mo-
nopolized the market by combining its browser with its operating sys-
tem,223 it is the grounds on which the court ruled that are interesting. In
effect, the court ruled that Microsoft wrongfully denied its customers
(i.e., the computer manufacturers) the ability to remove the browser
when they so desired.224 If the products were so designed as to make that
removal impossible, then Microsoft bore the burden of showing an effi-
ciency reason for barring the disintegration of the two products. 225 Thus,
for example, commingling the code for the operating system and the
browser in the same files effectively prevented the removal of the
browser, and because Microsoft was unable to justify this commingling as
contributing in any way to the product's value, the court ruled that the
commingling constituted an act of monopolization.
226
To fully appreciate the court's monopoly ruling, it is necessary to ob-
serve that the monopolization theory underlying the Justice Depart-
ment's case was somewhat unique.2 27 Monopolization consists of
acquiring or maintaining a monopoly through unlawful means. 228 Mo-
nopolization cases often involve a contention that a firm possessing mar-
ket power has attempted to leverage that power to create a monopoly in
that or another market.229 Microsoft, however, was charged with monop-
olization through unlawful maintenance.230 Although the courts have
gradually worked out some standards by which to evaluate claims of un-
lawful acquisition, they have not developed precise standards for evaluat-
ing claims of unlawful maintenance. The D.C. Circuit dealt with the lack
of standards for evaluating monopoly maintenance claims in two ways.
First, it relaxed the causal standards for connecting the defendant's be-
221. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d at 952.
222. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
223. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
224. Id. (finding that Microsoft had excluded the browser from the "Add/Remove Pro-
grams," thereby making it difficult or impossible to remove).
225. Id. at 67.
226. Id.
227. See Daniel J. Gifford, What is Monopolization anyway? The D.C. Circuit Grapples
with some Perplexing Issues, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 797 (2001).
228. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (describing monopoli-
zation as "the willful acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power "as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident").
229. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
230. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 45.
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havior and the likely market impact.231 The high causal standards gener-
ally imposed in acquisition cases were deemed inapplicable. Second, it
required Microsoft to come forward with a reason for combining its
browser with its operating system. 232
When it dealt with the section one tying issue, however, the issue be-
came an alleged restraint of competition in the browser market. Under
then-existing law, tying arrangements by a firm with market power would
be condemned as per se illegal. 233 Microsoft possessed market power, so
the issue would have been whether two products were tied together or
were so integrated as to constitute only one product (so that there was no
tie). That issue, in turn, depended upon whether the plaintiff could estab-
lish separate demands for the browser and the operating system. The
existence of separate demands, as the test for deciding whether one or
two products are involved, had been formulated by the Supreme Court in
1984, in its Jefferson Parish decision.234
The court of appeals, however, ruled that the separate demand test was
actually a proxy for efficiency.235 Normally, where integration would be
more efficient, buyers would demand the combination.236 But, platform
software advances have often taken the form of integrating previously
separate functionalities into the platform.237 Since there is almost always
a pre-existing software program providing functionality before that func-
tionality is integrated into an operating system, the separate demand test
would essentially treat all expansions of operating systems as ties.238 The
court thus concluded that the use of a separate demand test would be
likely to deter efficient advances in platform software where efficiency
dictated integration of new functionalities into the platform. 239 For these
reasons, the court rejected the per se test as applied to the integration of
new functionalities into platform software.240 Rather, the court ruled
that this type of integration would be governed by the rule of reason.241
Under the rule of reason, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that integration of new functionalities into platform software is
inefficient. 242
In short, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia adopted an efficiency test for evaluating ties involving platform
software under both section one and section two.243 Where the charge
231. Id. at 78-80.
232. Id. at 66-67.
233. See id. at 84-85.
234. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
235. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 88.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 89.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 94.
243. Id.
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was monopolization, the court placed the burden of showing that the de-
sign was efficient upon the defendant monopolist.2 44 Where the issue waF
tying under section one, the burden of showing that the arrangement was
inefficient was placed upon the government-plaintiff. 245 However, the
court made clear that under both sections, the issue turned on the effi-
ciency of the integration. 246 Restated, the issue turned upon whether
combining the two products generated greater value.
2. Under European Competition Law
The European Commission currently appears to be taking an approach
to the integration of platform software that is the mirror image of the
D.C. Circuit's decision on the section one tying issue. Whereas the
United States court presumed that integration of functionalities into the
operating system was lawful,247 the European Commission construed
similar behavior as an abuse of dominant position. The issue before the
European Commission involved the integration of the Windows Media
Player into the Windows operating system. 248 That integration, of course,
disadvantages independent vendors of media software, but it appears to
enhance the usefulness of the operating system to the advantage of con-
sumers, just as the integration of other functionalities into the operating
system in the past has advantaged consumers. The European Commis-
sion's view, however, is that its decision will enable computer manufac-
turers to install media players of other brands, whenever consumer tastes
so indicate.249 The Commission may be viewing the Windows operating
system as an essential facility to which rival software companies need
access.
250
The extent to which intellectual property (or an intellectual property
product) may be treated as an essential facility has been at the cutting
edge of European law for the last decade. In the early 1990s, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ruled, in the now widely discussed Magill case,251
that a copyright holder's refusal to license a potential competitor in a
derivative market could constitute an abuse of dominant position. That
case involved the refusal by several television broadcasters to make their
programming schedules available to an independent publisher that
wished to publish a combined programming guide. 252 In the early 1990s,
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 95.
248. European Commission Press Release, Brussels, 24 March 2004 (Commission con-
cludes Microsoft Investigation, imposes conduct remedies and a fine).
249. Id.
250. The court of the First Instance has rebuffed Microsoft's petition to stay the relief
ordered by the Commission pending appeal. Order of the President of the Court of First
Instance in case T-201/04 R, Dec. 22, 2004 (Press Release No. 103/04).
251. Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1995 ECR I-
0743.
252. Id.
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the television programming available to the Irish public was provided by
the Irish network, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) (two channels), the Brit-
ish Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (two channels), Independent Tele-
Vision (ITV), and Channel 4.253 Each of these television networks
published its own programming guide, but there was no comprehensive
guide to all programming. 254
Magill saw an opportunity to fill a demand by publishing a comprehen-
sive programming guide. When it published its comprehensive guide
however, RTE, the BBC and Independent Television Publications (the
publication arm of IBA) brought suit against Magill for copyright in-
fringement.255 They sought and obtained from the Irish courts an injunc-
tion against Magill's use of their programming schedules. 256
Magill, in turn, complained to the European Commission. The Euro-
pean Commission sided with Magill, charging that the television broad-
casters were abusing dominant positions in refusing to license their
schedules to Magill. 257 As a result of the abuse, the broadcasters were
ordered to supply their television schedules to Magill at a reasonable roy-
alty.258 The European Commission's ruling was upheld by both the Court
of First Instance and the Court of Justice.259
American observers are generally struck by several aspects of the Ma-
gill ruling. First, the Court of Justice imposed a duty on the broadcasters
to license their copyrighted material to a rival that wanted to supply a
product that the copyright holders themselves did not offer. Under
United States law, a copyright holder normally may deny permission to
others to use the copyrighted materials even in an unserved market.260
American observers, however, are generally surprised that the informa-
tion in the program schedules was protectable under the Irish copyright
law. In the United States, such material would be considered "factual"
and consequently unprotectable. 261 Indeed, it appears that this kind of
information would not be protectable under the laws of most of the mem-
ber states of the European Union.262 The intriguing aspects of the Magill
ruling, however, concern the extent to which the exclusive rights con-
ferred by intellectual property protection can be deemed to confer a
dominant position on the rights holder, with a concomitant obligation
upon the rights holder to license others to use those rights.
253. Id. ITV and Channel 4 were both provided by the Independent Broadcasting
Authority.
254. Id. 7-10.
255. Id. T 10.
256. Id.
257. Independent Television Publications Ltd. V. E.C. Commission, 1991 4 C.M.L.R
745 (CFI, 2d Chamber), appeal dismissed, 1995 E.C.R. 1-0743.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1984); Georgia
Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
261. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45, 347-48 (1991).
262. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 119 (7th ed. 2000).
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The Court of Justice has recognized that the imposition upon an intel-
lectual property rights holder of an obligation to deal would effectively
negate the exclusivity conferred by the intellectual property.2 63 On that
rationale, the Court upheld Volvo's right to refuse to license independent
parts manufacturers to produce parts over which Volvo held design
rights. 264 Yet the issue is at the core of the litigation in IMS Health.265
The latter case involved the right to use a scheme for the classification of
data relating to the use of pharmaceutical products that had been devel-
oped by IMS in connection with information-collecting activities that it
was conducting for pharmaceutical companies. 266 IMS was the only com-
pany collecting that kind of information on a regional basis in Ger-
many. 267 Its information-collection system involved the use of a large
number of small geographical categories or units in which the informa-
tion was kept.268 When rival information-collection companies tried to
compete with IMS, they discovered that because the pharmaceutical com-
panies were already invested in using the IMS classification system, they
could not effectively compete unless they could use that classification sys-
tem also.269 Taking the view that the IMS's classification was a de facto
industry standard to which rivals were entitled to access, the Commission
initially sided with the rivals, ordering IMS to license the competitors to
use its classification system, pending a final decision by the Commission
on its exclusivity rights.270 The Court of the First Instance, however, va-
cated the Commission's interim order. And as of this writing, the Court
of Justice has ruled that a dominant firm like IMS must license a rival
only in cases in which the rival seeks to market a product different from
the product of the rights-holder and when the refusal has the effect of
reserving to the rights holder the entire market for the supply of pharma-
ceutical sales data.271 The Court referred the determination of these
questions to the national courts in Germany.
Valentine Korah views the Commission's interim order in IMS Health
as an extension of Magill, in that the license was ordered in Magill to
enable the entrant to meet an unserved demand, while in IMS Health, the
license was ordered to enable new entrants to compete with an incum-
bent that was already supplying the desired product.272 Because Korah
appears to view Magill as an "exceptional" inroad into intellectual prop-
263. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
264. Id.
265. Commission Decision 2002/165/EC or NDC Health/IMS Health: Interim Measure
2001 O.J. (L 59) 18,167.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. IMS Health Gmbh & Co. v. NDC Health Gmbh & Co., Case C-417 (5th Chamber)
(Apr. 29, 2004)).
272. Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The
European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 825 (2001).
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erty rights,273 her unease with IMS Health is not surprising.2 74 Yet, as
discussed below, it is not clear that the results in Magill and the Commis-
sion's approach in IMS Health would not be duplicated in the American
legal system, albeit by different routes.
Magill and IMS Health deal with the intersection of intellectual prop-
erty and competition laws. For that reason, the issues raised by these
cases resonate in American law. Prior to the United States Supreme
Court's clarification of the law governing the protectability of directories,
one American court had ruled that the informational content of a tele-
phone directory should be made available to a rival publisher under the
essential facilities doctrine, 275 a decision similar to Magill. After Feist,2 76
however, such an invocation of the essential facilities doctrine would be
unnecessary in that type of case. Even so, there are other contexts in
which American courts might sometimes act in ways that resemble the
actions of the European Commission. In its Kodak decision,2 77 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit effectively imposed
an obligation upon an intellectual property rights holder to supply parts
to competitors. 278 In the Kodak case, independent servicing organiza-
tions that wanted to service Kodak high-speed copiers and micrographic
equipment were impeded from doing so because Kodak had refused to
sell them replacement parts.279 In subsequent antitrust litigation, Kodak
defended its refusal, partially on the ground that some of the parts were
patented and that its refusal was condoned by the patent law. 280 The
Ninth Circuit agreed that Kodak's refusal was presumptively lawful, but
nonetheless ruled against Kodak on the ground that the jury had implic-
itly found that its assertion of patent rights was merely a "pretext" for
violating the antitrust laws. 281
The Ninth Circuit's approach was later rejected by the Federal Circuit
in a similar case involving the Xerox Corporation on the ground that it
undermined intellectual property protections by making them dependent
upon the subjective intent of the rights holder. 28 2 The Federal Circuit,
accordingly, ruled that the patent laws conferred upon Xerox a right to
refuse to supply protected replacement parts to independent service orga-
nizations and that the copyright laws gave it the right to refuse to supply
copyrighted manuals to the independent servicing organizations.283
273. Korah, supra note 272, at 814.
274. Id. at 828-29.
275. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Pub'g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551
(S.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
276. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
277. Image Technical Serv. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1997).
278. Id. at 1219.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1220.
282. Id.
283. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1077 (2001).
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The litigation in both the European Union and the United States raises
issues concerning the extent to which competition-law policies will be em-
ployed to override intellectual property protection. The European cases
show that the authorities there are troubled by this complex issue and yet
remain puzzled as to its proper resolution. The Commission appears to
be aggressively pursuing competition law at the expense of intellectual
property rights in both the Magill and IMS Health cases, while the Court
of First Instance appears to be attempting to limit Magill. The Court of
Justice has now taken an ostensibly narrow approach to the interpreta-
tion of Magill, but its decision is nonetheless cast in language that is po-
tentially open to developing into a position resembling the
Commission's. 284 In the United States, a close analogue to the Magill
case would not arise because the underlying information would not be
protectable. 285 But, it is not entirely clear how an analogue to IMS
Health would be decided. The Seventh Circuit has protected a taxonomy
of dental procedures from copying, while indicating that the categories
themselves could be freely used by dentists and others.286 In a similar
case, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the copyright in a taxonomy of medi-
cal procedures, while indicating that copyright would not be permitted to
deny access to a classification system that had become an industry stan-
dard.287 These cases suggest, but do not decide, that pure IMS Health-
type issues might be resolved in the United States in favor of the rivals'
claims for access under the copyright laws themselves.
The American law differs significantly from the European law, how-
ever, because the limits on intellectual property more-often-than-not
arise under the intellectual property laws, thus avoiding a clash with the
antitrust laws. American copyright law is deeply influenced by principles,
traditions, and even specific statutory provisions that deny protection to
the utilitarian,288 that exclude from protection ideas and systems,289 and
that treat accessibility to a system as a positive value.290 In addition, the
American intellectual property laws have incorporated their own compe-
tition policy concerns in their misuse doctrines. As a result, the potential
284. The Court ruled that IMS is not required to license a rival so long as the rival is not
offering a different product. Yet the Court did not provide criteria for determining how
different the rival's product must be in order to satisfy this condition. The Court also
indicated that when a refusal to license an intellectual property right reserves a connected
market (such as the supply of data) to the rights holder, an important condition for finding
a violation is satisfied.
285. Factual information, such as television schedules, is not protectable under United
States copyright law. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
286. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997).
287. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1997).
288. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (2004) (denying protection to the utilitarian); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
289. Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 6 HIGH TECH. L.J. 209, 226 n.73
(1991).
290. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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conflicts between intellectual property laws and antitrust laws are re-
duced. Even where these two sets of laws facially conflict, antitrust law is
being construed to respect intellectual property concerns. In the
Microsoft case, 291 for example, the District of Columbia Circuit allowed
antitrust law to trump copyright law in those instances in which the court
determined that a substantial copyright policy would not be undermined,
but allowed copyright law to trump antitrust law where a substantial cop-
yright policy would otherwise be jeopardized. 292 Indeed, there appears to
be an emerging synthesis of intellectual property and antitrust laws in
which the long-term goals of intellectual property law are increasingly
respected. 293
An American-type synthesis of intellectual property and competition
law is more difficult in Europe, because the European Union currently
possesses a Union-wide competition law, but only national intellectual
property laws. As a result, it is more difficult for the varying national
intellectual property policies to be incorporated into the construction of
Union-wide competition law. And, it is also difficult, albeit not impossi-
ble, for the national courts to incorporate European competition policy
concerns into their national intellectual property laws. These impedi-
ments to harmonization, within Europe, of intellectual property law with
competition law means that the interactions of these two sets of laws are
likely to produce a less than efficient result. Because competition laws
exist on a Union-wide scale and are enforceable by Union institutions,
conflicts are likely to be resolved in favor of the competition laws; thus,
sacrificing the long-term goals of intellectual property law for the shorter-
term focus of competition law.
3. Ramifications for the Misuse Doctrine.
This new emphasis on efficiency as permeating the analysis of tying
arrangements under both sections of the Sherman Act is likely also to
influence the development of the copyright misuse doctrine. Copyright
misuse should be focusing upon preventing copyright from diverting from
its underlying purpose of fostering creative activity. As applied to intel-
lectual property, the misuse doctrine would best achieve that end by in-
corporating an efficiency standard. The Fourth Circuit's rejection of a
rule-of-reason (and hence an efficiency) analysis in the Lasercomb deci-
sion was a misstep. 294 The rejection of an efficiency standard explains the
anomalous result reached by the Ninth Circuit in the Practice Manage-
ment decision.295 In Practice Management, the court ruled that an exclu-
291. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
292. Id.
293. Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface, 31 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 363, 414-17 (2002); Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of
Standard-Setting Issues Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331, 388-
92 (2003).
294. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977.
295. Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 520.
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sive supply provision in a licensing agreement constituted misuse, not
because of anticompetitive effect of the contractual provision, but be-
cause that kind of restraint was combined with a copyright license. 296
Such decisions do nothing to further the underlying purpose of copyright
law, that is, the creation of social value through the encouragement of
creativity. Eventually, however, the courts are likely to modify copyright
misuse doctrine in the light of their growing awareness of how the effi-
ciency considerations that permeate antitrust law can further the underly-
ing goals of copyright law as well.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS
This paper has examined the policies of governmental institutions in
the United States, Canada, and the European Community towards inno-
vation. It examined several discrete problem areas with a view of devel-
oping a better understanding of how impediments to advancing aggregate
welfare develop within these several political systems. In particular, the
paper focused upon areas in which intellectual property concerns were
inaccurately analyzed by institutional actors; where intellectual property
concerns ran into conflict or potential conflict with imbedded legal doc-
trines; and where those concerns were undermined by conflicting political
pressures. In addition to identifying several places in which governmen-
tal institutions appear to be acting to impede social welfare, the paper
revealed instances in which national welfare conflicts with the aggregate
welfare of a larger jurisdictional unit or with global welfare. The paper
provided a possible scenario for resolving an apparently intractable policy
conflict in the European Union between policies favoring the free move-
ment of goods and policies fostering innovation. Finally, the paper
showed how United States courts are gradually attaining a sophisticated
understanding of intellectual property concerns and using their new
awareness to rationalize several substantive areas of law impinging upon
intellectual property rights; and places where judicial institutions are ac-
tually improving their levels of analysis.
296. Id.
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